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Abstract: This study enquires into the multi-dimensional challenges involved in tracing, freezing and 
repatriating looted state assets in foreign jurisdictions. It is the view of this paper that the forms of 
proceeding available in Nigeria to recover looted assets are inadequate. The paper discusses the 
successful assets recovery cases and the not so successful cases involving Nigerian corrupt officials. 
The paper examines the main challenges to assets recovery through criminal proceedings and also 
highlights various approaches to assets recovery. The paper recommends that for effective assets 
recovery, Nigeria must among others enact forfeiture and confiscation laws that should be applied 
through the civil process rather than the traditional criminal justice system. The paper proposes some 
strategies for assets repatriation, but warns that the success of these proposals are contingent on strong 
political will on the part of the Nigerian government and its ability to constructively engage the 
requested state. 
Keywords: repatriation, asset recovery 
 
1. Introduction 
The effect of corruption in Africa is overwhelming, whereas, the recovery of looted 
assets is underwhelming. Corruption, particularly grand corruption,
2
 is a catalyst to 
                                                             
1 Lecturer. PhD, University of Lagos, Akoka-Yaba, Lagos State, Nigeria. Address: PMB 0001, Lasu, 
Ojo, Lagos, Nigeria, Tel. +2348152136590. Corresponding author: aodusote@unilag.edu.ng. 
2 John Conyngham Esq, Global Director of Investigations, Control Risks Group Limited, in his 
testimony before the Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and 
Consumer Credit, US House of Representatives 9 May 2002, entitled “Recovering Dictator‘s Plunder’ 
stated: [G]rand corruption typically consists of the payments of large bribes often in millions of 
dollars to secure commercial contracts or other business advantage. In its most extreme form grand 
corruption can amount to state capture where corrupt interests control the state itself and manipulate 
the machinery of government to serve their private interests. Former President Mobutu‘s kleptocracy 
in Zaire, his ”salary‘ was reported at one point as equaling 17% of the national budget and his 
”personal allowance‘ exceeded the combined expenditure on education, health and social services 
and former President Slobodan Milosevic‘s actions in Serbia are widely perceived to be classic 
examples of this phenomenon.’’ Available at: 
http://www.ipocafrica.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=69&Itemid=68, 
Accessed 12 September 2011. 
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underdevelopment. According to the UN Committee: “It is widely recognized that 
corruption is a threat to the stability of societies, the establishment and 
maintenance of the rule of law and economic and political progress. Any 
meaningful solution to the problem must account for the recovery of the assets 
derived from corruption. The recovery and return of those ill-gotten gains can 
make a significant difference to countries recovering from corruption and sends 
the important message that the international community will not tolerate such 
unlawful conduct”.1 
Assets repatriation is a term used to describe efforts by governments to repatriate 
the proceeds of corruption recovered from corrupt officials. These are state 
resources illicitly converted and most often transferred to other jurisdictions. The 
sum involved is staggering. According to the Nyanga Declaration on the Recovery 
and Repatriation of Africa’s Wealth:2 An estimated US$ 20-40 billion has over the 
decades been illegally and corruptly appropriated from some of the world’s poorest 
countries, most of them in Africa, by politicians, soldiers, businesspersons and 
other leaders, and kept abroad in the form of cash, stocks and bonds, real estate and 
other assets. 
It is generally agreed that Nigeria is suffering from the worst form of corruption 
regime
3
. Corruption is well rooted in Nigeria. She is reputed to be one of the most 
corrupt and fraudulent countries in the world. The proceeds of corruption are often 
taken out of Nigeria. This has severe consequences for the country. It undermines 
socio-economic development, reduces foreign reserves, induces chronic poverty 
and increases armed conflicts and internal strife. The harm caused by corruption is 
terrific and devastating. 
Recovery of proceeds of corruption stored in foreign jurisdiction always involves 
complex legal and technical efforts. Major challenges in asset tracking, recovery 
and repatriation of illicit and stolen wealth include: immunities of government 
                                                             
1 Ad Hoc Committee for the Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption United Nations, "Global 
study on the transfer of funds of illicit origin, especially funds derived from acts of corruption", Doc 
A/AC.261/12 28 November 2002, para 7. 
2 The Nyanga Declaration was signed on 4 March 2001 by representatives of Transparency 
International in Botswana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, South Africa, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Available at: www.transparency.org (Accessed 14 September 2013) 
3 Transparency International (TI), Corruption Perception Index from 1995 to 2007.  
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officials from criminal prosecution
1
, which can preclude effective prosecution and 
pursuit of illicit assets in corruption cases, few anti-corruption institutions, high 
costs in coordinating investigations, lack of political will, inadequate funding, 
insufficient information, and limited state capacity. The most crippling obstacle is 
the fact that the corrupt elites are always still powerful enough to stall 
investigations, influence judicial proceedings and threaten the lives of anti-
corruption agencies’ officials, while some anti-corruption agencies’ officials lose 
their lives in the process.
2
 According to Ribadu: “When you fight corruption, it 
fights back. It will likely have greater resources than you, and it is led by those who 
operate outside the law and view the fight as life‐and‐death for their survival”. 
(Ribadu, 2009)
3
 
In addition to problems highlighted above, often differences exist in the legal 
system between the receiving state and the requesting state. Also, jurisdictions 
where stolen assets are hidden may not be responsive to requests for legal 
assistance or may impose very onerous conditions before the ill-gotten assets could 
be repatriated.  
The process and obstacles encountered in repatriating ill-gotten wealth has received 
little attention from academic researchers. This chapter thus focuses on efforts to 
trace, identify, confiscate and return stolen assets to Nigeria by law enforcement 
agencies, and through assistance from other states. The research enquires into 
forms of proceedings that are available to recover ill-gotten assets. Also examined 
is the evidence-gathering process and methodology. The chapter further explores 
effectiveness of the legal process as a tool underpinning assets tracking and 
recovery of stolen wealth (particularly in a conviction-based regime as Nigeria) in 
the light of the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) 2003
4
, 
which is the first comprehensive instrument of the UN aimed at combating 
corruption. This is juxtaposed with the inherent advantages of a non-conviction 
                                                             
1 Section 308 of the 1999 Constitution provides that certain public officers – the President, Vice 
President, 36 Governors and the Deputy Governors shall not be subject to civil and criminal 
prosecution during their stay in office. 
2 For example, the head of the Forensic Unit of the EFCC, Abdullahi Muazu, was assassinated in 
Kaduna on 14 September 2010.  
Details available at: http://234next.com/csp/cms/sites/Next/News/5619080-
147/gunmen_kill_efccs_forensic_team_leader.csp (Accessed 9 September 2011). 
3 Aailable at: http://www.house.gov/apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs_dem/ribadu_testimony.pdf 
(Accessed 10 September 2011). 
4 UNCAC: Nigeria signed in 2003 and ratified in 2004. 
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regime and similar ancillary tools. This chapter concludes that, for more effective 
and successful recovery of ill-gotten wealth, Nigeria needs to embrace a 
combination of conviction and non-conviction regimes. 
I think there ought to be a statement on how the sections or subsections will 
progress. Moreover, the sections/subsections ought to be consistently numbered. 
 
2. Assets Recovery 
Article 51 of the UNCAC states that: “The return of assets … is a fundamental 
principle of this Convention, and States Parties shall afford one another the widest 
measure of cooperation and assistance in this regard”. 
This is an unprecedented provision which gives a state the right to recover its 
stolen assets. The UNCAC provisions lay a framework, in both civil and criminal 
law, for tracing, freezing, forfeiting, and returning funds obtained through corrupt 
activities. The process of tracing, confiscating and repatriating stolen wealth is 
complicated. The first step is the tracing of stolen wealth by the anti-corruption 
agencies. The second stage is to request that authorities of the country where the 
assets are domiciled confiscate the stolen wealth. The may be done through the 
procedure stipulated in the UNCAC or through a Mutual Legal Assistance or other 
treaties between the two states. Then the assets may be repatriated to its country of 
origin. 
 
2.1. Nigerian Legal Framework 
Under the Nigerian legal framework, which consists of international
1
, regional
2
, 
bilateral
1
 and local mechanisms
2
, there are three different types of confiscation 
                                                             
1 OECD: Anti-Bribery Convention 1997; The London Scheme for Extradition within the 
Commonwealth (incorporating the amendments agreed at Kingstown in November 2002); United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (signed December 2000, ratified June 
2001); International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 1999; UN 
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism of 9 December 1999; UN Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988; United Nations 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988; United 
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), 2000; UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime (UNTOC), General Assembly resolution 55/25, 15 November 2000. 
The structure of these citations can consistently be slightly improved upon. 
2 OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, 1999; African Union - OAU 
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, adopted on 14 July 1999 ; African Union 
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procedures which can be adopted in the recovery of stolen wealth stored in another 
country: conviction based, non-conviction based and ordinary civil litigation. 
Nigeria has several well-drafted pieces of legislation enacted to combat various 
types of corruption. The principal legislations on assets recovery and repatriation in 
Nigeria are conviction-based including the Corrupt Practices and Other Related 
Offences Act 2004 and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) 
(Establishment) Act 2004. Presently, Nigeria does not have a non-conviction based 
assets forfeiture regime
3
.  
 
3. The Court and Assets Repatriation Proceedings 
Criminal Action 
Assets repatriation proceedings can take many forms: (a) the enforcement 
authorities might institute criminal actions in Nigeria against the suspect, on 
conviction, judgment will then be enforced in the receiving state, that is, the state 
where the monies are hidden; (b) where it is permissible within the legal 
framework, the state where the monies are hidden may commence proceedings 
against the suspect leading to forfeiture of the monies to either state; (c) 
proceedings may also be initiated by the state of origin, in the state where the 
monies are hidden; or a combination of these steps. “Criminal mechanisms to 
recover the corruptly acquired assets of a public official depend first on criminal 
conviction of the wrongdoer, either in his or her domestic courts or in the courts of 
the jurisdiction where his or her illicit assets are located, and secondly on an 
enforceable and final confiscation order against his assets” (Daniel & Maton, 
1998, pp. 245-268) 
                                                                                                                                                           
Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption, 2003 ; Nairobi Declaration on International 
Obligations and on the Recovery and Repatriation of Africa's Stolen Wealth, 2006; Nairobi 
Declaration on asset recovery by representatives of Transparency International from 7 African 
countries, 2006; ECOWAS Treaty on Exchange of Information on Criminal Matters; and African 
Convention on Prevention and Combating Corruption. 
1 Law Enforcement Cooperation Agreement with the United States of America, 2001; and 
Nigeria/South Africa Bilateral Treaty on criminal matters, 2001. 
2 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act, 2004 (EFCC Act, 2004);Corrupt Practices and 
other Related Offences Act, 2000 (ICPC Act, 2000);Code of Conduct Act, 1989;Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999; Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act, 2004; Advance Fee Fraud 
and other Fraud Related Offences Act, 2006. 
3 Seizure and forfeiture of cash and assets is either through plea bargain or through a court order. No 
rules have been made by the Attorney‐General under section 31 (4) and 43 of the EFCC Act 2004. 
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According to Daniel and Maton, this method faces many challenges. Some of these 
challenges are highlighted below: In Criminal proceedings, it is necessary the 
accused is present before the court to stand trial. In some assets recovery cases 
however, the suspect may be dead, or may have fled the country either to avoid 
arrest or prosecution.
1
 It is also difficult to obtain criminal conviction because this 
class of suspects can afford to hire the best lawyers available in the country; 
intimidation and harassment of witnesses are also likely to impede trials. Not 
forgetting the standard of proof required in a criminal case is ‘proof beyond 
reasonable doubt.
2
  
In addition, where conviction is secured, executing such judgment in foreign 
jurisdiction is challenging. First, there must be an arrangement in place. Second, 
the trials must have met public policy requirement of the requested state legal 
framework. For example, European judges must be satisfied that proceedings 
obtained abroad meets the justice requirement of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR)
3
. It is arguable that Nigeria judgments meet such 
requirements. The stolen funds are probably held in the names of friends, 
associates and proxies that will bring all sorts of application to challenge the 
enforcement of the confiscation order. It is also a requirement for a country seeking 
foreign enforcement to have given the parties involved the opportunity to appeal 
the judgment, and explore all available remedies in the process. This will take 
several years in Nigeria. 
Action against Property 
Article 54(1) (c) of United Nations Convention against Corruption, recognizes 
actions in rem: “1. Each State Party, in order to provide mutual legal assistance 
pursuant to article 55 of this Convention with respect to property acquired through 
or involved in the commission of an offence established in accordance with this 
Convention, shall, in accordance with its domestic law: (c) Consider taking such 
measures as may be necessary to allow confiscation of such property without a 
criminal conviction in cases in which the offender cannot be prosecuted by reason 
of death, flight or absence or in other appropriate cases”. 
                                                             
1 Diepreye Alamyeseigha of Bayelsa State, and Joshua Dariye of Plateau State, both jumped bail and 
fled back to Nigeria from England where they were facing criminal charges relating to corruption and 
money laundering. 
2 Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462. 
3 Supra note 13. 
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These are civil procedures against property (in rem) (Casella, 2008, pp. 8-14). This 
procedure is available where the accused is dead, absconded or absence. It is a non-
conviction method
1
 of confiscating proceeds of crime in the absence of a criminal 
conviction. In this instance, an enforcement agency like the EFCC is given the 
power to proceed, with good reasons, and seize assets derived from corruption. 
There is no requirement for either a civil or criminal conviction in order to 
confiscate such assets (Kofele-Kale, 2006, p. 909). The action is directed against 
the property and not the person. The enforcement agencies only need to prove that 
the assets are derived from corrupt related activities. It is difficult if not impossible 
to find appropriate local laws that will accommodate this procedure at present.
2
 
In support of this procedure the Chairman of EFCC emphatically stated: “If culprits 
cannot be tried and convicted; they can at least have their assets confiscated 
without the necessity of a trial, conviction and sentence. It is a democratic law that 
seeks to take back assets illicitly acquired and deny the corrupt the enjoyment of 
loot they are not entitled to in the first instance”. (Waziri, 2009) 
In August 20ll, the House of Representative voted against the second reading of the 
Bill to amend the EFCC Act 2004 that may allow for action against property. The 
proposed Bill was “to make provisions for the restraint and civil forfeiture of 
property derived from unlawful activity and any instrumentalities used or intended 
to be used in the commission of unlawful activity and to make provision for the 
investigation of benefit derived from corruption, money laundering and 
instrumentalities.“ The bill was defeated. 
Civil Proceedings 
The principle of civil proceedings is recognised in Article 53 of UNCAC, which 
requires that: “Each State Party shall, in accordance with its domestic law: (a) 
Take such measures as may be necessary to permit another State Party to initiate 
civil action in its courts to establish title to or ownership of property acquired 
through the commission of an offence established in accordance with this 
Convention; (b) Take such measures as may be necessary to permit its courts to 
order those who have committed offences established in accordance with this 
                                                             
1 The Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative –StAR- (World Bank and UNODC) have recently published a 
Non Conviction Based Guide which provides practical advice to jurisdictions contemplating NCB 
asset forfeiture legislation in line with Article 54(1). 
2 Section 35 of the Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria provides that an accused is innocent 
until proven guilty.  
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Convention to pay compensation or damages to another State Party that has been 
harmed by such offences”. 
A requisite for this type of action is that the defendant has a connection with the 
jurisdiction.
1
 The foreign jurisdiction is seized of jurisdiction, when the stolen 
property is within its jurisdiction, or the defendant lives within jurisdiction. Any act 
of connection between the defendant, the items and the receiving country is 
sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the foreign country. The family members, 
relatives and business associates may also be joined as defendants. 
In civil law jurisdictions, the requesting state is allowed to join criminal 
proceedings as an interested party. Proceedings may be commenced by an 
investigating magistrate through a request for Mutual Legal Assistance. The 
requesting state will be allowed to participate in the trial.
2
 
This method is the most efficient mechanism of asset repatriation. The burden of 
proof is based on a balance of probabilities, which is lower than the beyond 
reasonable doubt burden in criminal cases. It is sufficient to prove that the 
defendant cannot justify the source of his wealth, or that his tax returns do not 
correlate with his wealth; absence of the defendant does not preclude trials; it is far 
simpler to pursue recovery of assets in foreign jurisdictions than local courts. 
The disadvantages of this mechanism include; high cost of private litigation, 
though this is usually a fraction of what is recoverable; compatibility of evidence 
between the requesting legal regime and the requested legal regime; it is also quite 
difficult for the requesting state to secure injunctions to freeze assets in the 
requested state. (Wilie, 1998, p. 147) 
Civil proceedings were adopted in Dariye’s case3. Joshua Dariye was the Governor 
of Plateau State Nigeria. Dariye's administration, misappropriated more than USD 
11.9 million. Huge amounts were siphoned to accounts in United Kindom. The 
accounts were held by his proxies and under his nickname “Joseph Dagwan”. 
Dariye also purchased properties in UK under the fictitious name. Joshua Dariye's 
ill-gotten wealth in the United Kingdom was confiscated through two civil 
actions against him by the Federal Government of Nigeria. Properties worth GBP. 
                                                             
1 The Federal Republic of Nigeria v Joshua Chibi Dariye and another [2007] EWHC 708 (Ch) and 
Attorney-General for and on behalf of the Republic of Zambia and Meer Care & Desai (a firm) & Ors 
[2005] EWHC 2102. 
2 Supra note 13. 
3 See also Islamic Republic of Pakistan v Asif Ali  Zardari and others [2006] EWHC 2411 (Comm). 
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395,000, and assets worth US $5.7 million were respectively recovered in the two 
cases. 
Unjust enrichment
1
 
At present, this is a common law and equitable remedy available in Nigeria. It is a 
potentially effective tool that is undervalued and underutilized in the assets 
recovery efforts. The application of the principle of unjust enrichment in assets 
repatriation requires restitution of ill-gotten wealth obtained from wrongful acts. In 
other words, entitlement generated by unjustified enrichment and at the expense of 
the state (Dickson, 1995, p. 99) must be restituted by the wrongdoer. An 
enrichment means anything of value whether moveable or immoveable, money or 
services (Beatson, 1990, p. 29) The categories of wrongs under this head includes: 
proceeds of failed contracts; proceeds of inflated contract, gains from contract 
splitting; payments made by mistakes; proceeds of white elephant projects; gains 
appropriation of government funds etc. Lord Mansfield describes unjust factors at 
common law to include mistakes, payments made pursuant to failure of 
consideration, cases of duress, exploitation etc.
2
 
All the applicant has to proof is that the wrongdoer is in possession of ill-gotten 
wealth at the expense of the state, consequent of which the state has been deprived, 
and it would be inequitable or unconscionable for the wrongdoer to enjoy the 
benefit of the unjust enrichment without restitution. 
In circumstances, where the earnings of the wrongdoer are not commensurate with 
his ill-gotten wealth, particularly, in corruption cases, the application of the 
principle of unjust enrichment has the potential to shift the burden of proof: “The 
use of an offence of unjust enrichment, where the onus shifts to the individual to 
show that the assets were acquired through legitimate means, can be an extremely 
effective tool to combat corruption”.3 
The wrongdoer has to justify his assets exceeding known sources of income. This 
will justify inference of corruption. Any assets in excess of his known income 
should be forfeited to the state as income derived from unjust enrichment
4
.  
                                                             
1 Examples of the application of this principle bound in the German Civil Code; Swiss Civil Code and 
the French Civil Code. 
2 Moses v Macferlan (1760) 2 Burr 1005, 97 ER 676. 
3 Report of the Commonwealth Working Group on Asset Repatriation (Commonwealth Secretariat: 
London 2005) Para 17. 
4 This principle is available in both the civil and common law jurisdictions. 
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4. International Diplomacy and Assets Recovery 
4.1. Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) 
Mutual legal assistance (MLA) is an agreement between states that makes state 
request and provide assistance in obtaining information or evidence located in one 
country, to assist in judicial investigations or proceedings in another country 
(Chaiken, 2006, pp. 192-214). For example, MLA may include the tracing, 
identification, and seizure of looted assets domiciled in the requested state. This 
may also extend to technical assistance and provision of aid. MLA is very vital in 
assets recovery process. 
There are two types of MLA (Chaiken, 2006, pp. 192-214). that may be required at 
different stages of judicial proceedings; the informal assistance that may not 
require coercive powers by the enforcement agencies may be given without a 
treaty, for example, day-to-day exchange of intelligence. Formal assistance 
requiring the use of coercive power by the requested state, for example, searches, 
arrests, confiscation, may require a formal MLA. Mutual legal assistance between 
Commonwealth countries is available on the basis of the Harare Scheme without a 
formal requirement for a bilateral treaty.  
In the case of Abacha, Nigeria sought the assistance of Swiss authorities through 
MLA. General Sani Abacha was the military Head of State of Nigeria from 17 
November 1993 to 8 June 1998. General Abdulsalami Abubakar and Olusegun 
Obasanjo respectively succeeded Abacha. They investigated the massive looting 
that occurred during Abacha’s regime. Abacha was estimated to have looted about 
USD 4 billion. Through mutual legal assistance submitted to Liechtenstein, 
Luxembourg, Switzerland, the UK, Jersey and the US, Nigeria was able to realize 
approximately USD 1.3 billion. The importance of international cooperation 
becomes evident when contrasting the eighteen year Philippine saga in recovering 
Marcos’s loot with the three to five years it took Peru and Nigeria to recover assets 
stolen by Montesinos and Abacha, respectively. The fact that Swiss authorities 
issued a general freezing order against Abacha with only a limited amount of initial 
evidence, and their decision to investigate Montesinos and freeze $48 million on 
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November 3, 2000, even before Peru formally requested it, illustrates a positive 
shift in the attitude toward international cooperation in stolen asset restitution
1
 
Under MLA, the requested state may offer diverse help ranging from assistance in 
securing evidence that may be used in securing conviction; obtaining confiscation 
order against the wrongdoer; recognition of confiscation order from the requesting 
state, assisting in implementing enforcement orders etc. Levels of available 
assistance are dependent on the terms of the MLA.  
 
5. The Nigerian Judiciary and Assets Recovery 
The Economic Financial Crime Commission (EFCC) has continued relentlessly in 
its effort to curb corruption, by arresting and prosecuting several high profile cases, 
unfortunately, conviction has been rather minimal. Corruption has continued at an 
alarming scale. No one seems to be bothered. Everyone recognizes the seeming 
incapacity of both the enforcement agencies and the courts to convict corrupt 
officials. In a conviction based regime, without first securing conviction, it is quite 
difficult to recover ill-gotten wealth.  The Nigerian judiciary has not been able to 
deal effectively with the menace of corruption. List of moribund or stalled trial is 
endless.
2
 For example, former Governor Dariye who has been convicted by a UK 
court is still facing money laundry charges in Abuja till date. A comparison 
between the number of arrests and arraignments since the inception of the EFCC, 
and the number of convictions recorded paints a gloomy picture. Where the 
prosecuting agencies have been able to secure trials, the punishment is usually a 
slap on the wrist, which is more of an invitation to others to emulate. The judiciary 
is faced with huge challenges; inadequate funding, inadequate resources; slow 
judicial process; and corruption. There is now a persistent call for special courts to 
handle corruption related matters
3
. According to a former Head of the EFCC, Mrs 
                                                             
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Bank ‘Stolen Asset Recovery 
(StAR) Initiative: Challenges, Opportunities, and Action Plan’ P. 30 Available at: 
www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/StAR-Sept07-full.pdf  (Accessed 02 Jan 2014) 
2 Ayo Fayose (former Governor of Ekiti State), Orji Uzo Kalu (former Governor of Abia State), 
Saminu Turaki(former Governor of Jigawa State), Joshua Dariye (former Governor of Plateua State), 
Chimaroke Nnamani (former Governor of Enugu State) (and Fani Kayode (former Minister of 
Aviation). 
3 The Nigerian Punch Newspaper, ‘Akanbi, NBA back special courts,’ Available at: 
http://www.punchng.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=3350:akanbi-nba-back-special-
courts&Itemid=542 Accessed on 03 November, 2011 Retired Justice Mustapha Akanbi was the 
former Chairman of the Independent Corrupt Practices and other related Offences Commission; The 
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Farida Waziri: “the slow judicial processes our courts are known for and the 
bureaucratic and legalistic bottlenecks of the judicial system of this country, do not 
allow us to achieve our stated goals easily. The legal process takes quite a lot of 
money, energy, time and deployment of personnel to get a single conviction. A 
special court for EFCC-related offences will take us away from the undue legalities 
that many brilliant lawyers have capitalized on to twist the hand of the courts and 
the commission. It is a common practice to define the success of an institution like 
the EFCC on the number of convictions it had. However, analysts should put into 
consideration the slow and windy justice system. Under the rule of law as 
enshrined in the Constitution, a person is presumed innocent until found guilty. If 
the perpetrators of corruption use the rule of law to frustrate attempts at bringing 
them to justice, then the state must device other appropriate methods. (Farida, 
2009) 
Chief Uchechukwu Uche also observed: We need special courts that can try 
corruption cases speedily. For such courts, there should be deadlines or time frames 
within which cases should be dispensed with. This is critical because, if people 
corruptly enrich themselves and know that they can exploit the judicial processes 
then they could go any length to perpetuate frauds in spite of the preaching by 
government. Yes, government has been saying that it is fighting corruption but I 
must say that the government is beginning to sound like a broken record. All we 
hear is talk, talk, talk about people being charged, there was corruption here, it was 
uncovered there, billions here, millions there. But we never hear a lot about 
convictions. If government is to make people know that something is truly 
happening in the fight against corruption, we need to see convictions
1
.  
Waziri’s frustration with the Nigerian judicial system underscores the use of plea 
bargaining as a tool of the EFCC in securing criminal convictions. This paper will 
now proceed to examine some of the criminal convictions that have been secured 
through plea bargaining. 
  
                                                                                                                                                           
Nigerian Tribune ‘CORRUPTION: Edwin Clark calls for state of emergency •Advocates special 
courts to review files of ex-govs, others’ Available at: 
http://www.tribune.com.ng/index.php/news/30669-corruption-edwin-clark-calls-for-state-of-
emergency-advocates-special-courts-to-review-files-of-ex-govs-others (Accessed 03 November 
2011). 
1 Chief Uchechukwu Uche is the President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Nigeria 
(ICAN) see the interview granted to Thisday Newspaper of 15 Jun 2009. 
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Plea bargaining and assets recovery 
Plea bargaining crept into the Nigerian legal system through the EFCC Act, 
Section 14(2) of the EFCC (Establishment) Act 2004, states that: “subject to the 
provision of section 174 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
1999, the Commission may compound any offence punishable under this Act by 
accepting sums of money as it thinks fit, not exceeding the sum of the maximum 
fine to which that person would have been liable if he had been convicted of that 
offence. Plea bargaining is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as: “a negotiated 
agreement between a prosecutor and a criminal defendant whereby the defendant 
pleads guilty to a lesser offence or to one of multiple charge in exchange for some 
concession by the prosecutor, usually a more lenient sentence or a dismissal of the 
other charges” (Garner, 2004) 
Some of the high profile criminal convictions secured through plea bargaining are 
discussed and set out below: 
Diepreye Alamieyeseigha’s case1 
Diepreye Alamieyeseigha was elected Governor of Bayelsa State in May 1999. In 
September 2005, he was arrested by the Proceeds of Corruption Unit of the London 
Metropolitan Police and was charged with money laundering offences. He was 
released on and later jumped bail. He was later impeached by the Bayelsa State 
House of Assembly. Afterwards, he was arrested by the EFCC and charged on 
money laundering and corruption offences. He pleaded guilty in July 2007, and 
was sentenced to two years in prison from the day of his arrest two years earlier. 
He was released a few hours after his sentence. 17.7 million naira was recovered 
from him through plea bargaining in Nigeria and non-conviction civil suit in 
London. 
Tafa Balogun’s case2 
Tafa Balogun, was a former Inspector-General of the Nigerian Police Force. He 
was charged, tried, convicted and sentenced for corruption and money laundry 
related charges. His assets worth over N17 billion were confiscated and returned to 
the Federal Government of Nigeria.  
                                                             
1 Available at https://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/node/18620(Last accessed on 14/02/2014); 
see also FGN V Alamieyeseigha Suit No. FHC/L/329C/05). 
2 Available at www.transparencyng.com, “Inspector-General Tafa Balogun Convicted: Jailed for Six 
Months” Law, Crime & Judiciary (Last accessed on 14/02/2014. 
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Chief Lucky Nosakhare Igbinedion’s case1  
Igbinedion a former Governor of Edo State in the South South part of Nigeria was 
arraigned on charges of corruption, money laundering and embezzlement of N2.9 
billion naira. He entered into plea bargaining and a 191-count was reduced to a 
mere one count charge: That you, Lucky Igbinedion (former Governor of Edo 
State) on or about January 21, 2008 within the Jurisdiction of this honorable court 
neglected to make a declaration of your interest in account No. 41240113983110 
with GTB in the declaration of assets form of the EFCC and you thereby 
committed an offence punishable under section 27 (3) of the EFCC Act 2004. 
Lucky Igbinedion was convicted on this one charge and the EFFCC was able to 
recover N500m, a few properties and was sentenced to six months imprisonment or 
pay N3.6 million as option of fine.  
This is undoubtedly a slap on the wrist. The EFCC pretended not to be satisfied 
with the judgment and appealed the option of fine. Early in 2013? the EFCC filed a 
fresh count of corruption
2
 against Lucky, he raised the defence of double jeopardy 
and the case was struck out.  
Cecilia Ibru’s Case3 
Cecilia Ibru was the former Chief Executive Officer of the Oceanic bank; she was 
charged and convicted of offences related to corruption; authorizing loans beyond 
her credit limit; rendering false accounts and approving loans without adequate 
collateral. The court in its ruling sentenced her to six months' imprisonment for 
each count, which is to run concurrently, and ordered the forfeiture of related assets 
worth N191.4billion. She entered into a plea bargaining, convicted and sentenced 
to imprisonment for a term of 6 months and forfeited some of her ill-gotten assets 
to the Assets Management Corporation of Nigeria. 
These cases do not portray the law enforcement agency as diligent and competent.  
It is apposite to mention that aside from the convictions secured through plea 
bargaining it is quite difficult to recall a high profile criminal conviction secured 
after full trial.
4
 This is not unconnected with the problems of criminal proceedings 
                                                             
1 Chief Lucky Nosakhare Igbinedion v FGN No FHC/EN/6C/2008. 
2 Suit No FHC/B/HC/2011.  
3 Federal Republic of Nigeria v Dr (Mrs) Cecilia Ibru FHC/L/297C/ 2009. 
4 The only case of note is the High Court judgment in Chief Bode George & Ors v Federal Republic 
of Nigeria ID/71C/2008. The case falls outside the scope of this paper as there was no assets recovery 
involved. 
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already highlighted above. In a conviction based criminal justice system, as 
Nigeria, it means assets recovery is limited to the few cases secured through plea 
bargaining. 
However, plea bargaining as being presently practiced is besieged with lots of 
problems. The problems of plea bargaining in relation to criminal proceedings in 
corruption cases include: lack of enabling legal framework; recovery of a fraction 
of sum involved, the Igbinedion case is a typical example of gross abuse of the 
process, a mockery of the system; discriminatory application of plea bargaining; 
and the secrecy surrounding negotiations. 
Onyema observed that: “It is pertinent to reveal, also, that the near secret manner 
with which the plea bargain is negotiated and secured does not help matters. Sadly 
enough, Nigerians only wake up to hear that the deal has been brokered. As a 
court process, its negotiation should be openly canvassed in the court. This will 
enable enlightened and informed Nigerians, perhaps, to make contribution(s) 
towards frustrating it”. (Onyema, 2011) 
Plea bargaining is an effective tool in assets recovery if well deployed. The case 
studies on Abacha, Alamaiseiha and Ibru stress the importance of introducing 
domestic reforms that can boost domestic asset recovery.  
 
6. Lessons for Nigeria 
Corruption is nourished by weak and ineffective legal institutions. Corruption, that 
is, grand corruption flourishes in an environment where the Judiciary is subservient 
to the Executive; where there is no regard for rule of law; where there is no proper 
accountability; where there is a culture of corruption tolerance.  
In sum, the procedures for assets recovery in Nigeria, at the moment, is conviction 
based, though under the Nigerian legislative framework, assets of the wrongdoer 
may be restrained by an order exparte once criminal investigation begins. This is 
fraught with lots of difficulties as the prosecutor will have to prove that the assets 
are proceeds of corruption. 
Nigeria needs to learn from past local and international experiences in order to 
have future successful assets recovery. From the foregoing analysis, it is important, 
for the government to remain focused at all times, without waning. Assets recovery 
is a very dangerous, tedious and lengthy expedition.  
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Following the successes recoded in the repatriation of Abacha, Dariye, and 
Alamasgbeiye’s loot. Nigeria is widely recognized by scholars as a touch-bearer in 
assets repatriation (Fofack & Ndikumana, 2008): “Nigeria is a prime example of 
what can happen when leaders say enough is enough to rampant corruption” 
Major obstacles to recovery often comes from within, in terms of state incapacity, 
lack of political will, lack of trained personal, general atmosphere of insecurity. 
Drawing from experiences highlighted above, this chapter suggests that for 
effective assets recovery priority should be given to the issues set out below: 
Political Will and Sustained Effort 
The Government of the Philippines sustained an effort over 18 years to recover part 
of Marcos’s loot (Chaiken, 2000). In 1986, the Republic of the Philippines filed a 
request for mutual assistance with the Swiss authorities in connection with the 
repatriation of Marcos deposits in Swiss banks. Twelve years elapsed before these 
deposits were transferred to escrow accounts in the Philippine National Bank 
(PNB) and another six years passed before the concerned $624 million was 
transferred to the Philippine Treasury. In between, several major legal hurdles had 
to be crossed, including presenting evidence that the monies were the product of 
embezzlement, diversion of public property, and plundering of the public treasury. 
Only after the Philippine government won a ruling that the monies could be moved 
out of Switzerland without a final conviction of Mrs. Marcos under article 74A of 
the International Mutual Assistance on Criminal Matters Act (IMAC) was the 
money moved to the Philippine National Bank in 1998. It was released to the 
Philippine Treasury in 2004 following a Philippine Supreme Court decision 
ordering the forfeiture of the Marcos Swiss deposits in July 2003.
1
 
Removal of Immunities from Prosecution  
The Nigerian Constitution provides absolute immunity to certain public officials 
while in office.
2
 These immunities present a major obstacle to the prosecution of 
corruption in Nigeria. If the fight against corruption is to be effective and asset 
recovery efforts to be successful, public officials should not be immune to 
prosecution against corrupt related offences
3
. Under international law, head of 
                                                             
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the World Bank ‘Stolen Asset Recovery 
(StAR) Initiative: Challenges, Opportunities, and Action Plan’ Available at: 
www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/StAR-Sept07-full.pdf (Accessed 10 October 2011). 
2 IMB v Tinubu (2001) 8 NWLR (pt. 740) 192 at 708 and 718. 
3 In virtually all the commonwealth countries there is no immunity for public officials. 
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governments and head of states generally enjoy immunity from prosecution abroad; 
however, there is emerging authority that they are no longer entitled to immunity 
where it involves offences like torture, war crimes, genocide and crimes against 
humanity.
1
 This chapter advocates that money laundering and corruption should be 
included under this exception. Compared to torture, and perhaps some war crimes, 
the effects of corruption is more devastating in developing states. Ghana provides a 
good example of a country that does not provide civil or criminal immunity for 
public officials. In the alternative, Nigeria may adopt the Cyprus model, whereby 
the prosecutor has to obtain the leave of the Supreme Court to press criminal 
charges against high ranking public officials for offences including corruption. 
Power to Prosecute Absconding or Dead Accused 
Nigeria should put in place an effective legislation for criminal conviction based 
asset confiscation. This should include a power to confiscate in circumstances 
where the accused has absconded or died. Nigeria should also put in place 
procedure for non-conviction based asset confiscation. Mutual legal assistance 
between countries should be available without a requirement for a bilateral treaty.  
Establishment of Special Courts  
Nigeria must establish a specialist and well respected court to handle corruption 
cases and assets recovery cases
2
. This will serve several purposes; designated, well 
trained and dedicated body will handle requests for assistance; likelihood of speedy 
trials; specialized knowledge of the area; and capacity-building for specialization 
of prosecutors and judges. South Africa presents an example of the importance of 
funding and staffing teams of prosecutors and judges. The country created a special 
commission to investigate corruption and special tribunals to adjudicate civil 
matters arising from those investigations. (Baqwa, 2001, p. 21) 
The Use of Search and Seize Orders 
The EFCC and the ICPC should be given the powers to enter, search, and seize 
documents the wrongdoer might possibly destroy or keep out of investigations. 
Human rights activist may deem this to be a violation of the wrongdoer’s right to 
                                                             
1UN Secretary-General, Preventing and Combating Corrupt Practice and Transfer of Assets of Illicit 
Origin and Returning such Assets to the Countries of Origin: Report of the Secretary-General. New 
York: UN General Assembly, 2006; Commonwealth Working Group on Asset Repatriation. Report. 
London: The Commonwealth, 2005.  
2 Ibidem. 
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privacy. However, this is in consonance with the principle in Anton Piller KG v 
Manufacturing Processes
1
  
The Use of Mareva Injuctions 
It is important to obtain an order of court retraining the wrongdoer from taking the 
stolen wealth out of jurisdiction or from dissipating or dealing in it. This is similar 
to a Mareva injunction. This order is to be served on the third party in possession 
of the items. For example, a bank may be served a Mareva injunction. This 
automatically freezes the money and the wrong doer may only be permitted to 
withdraw maintenance expenses. 
The Application of No says orders 
Financial institutions and financial advisers ordinarily have a duty to inform their 
clients of any order to make a disclosure about their client’s account. This may be 
detrimental to corruption cases. Once, the wrongdoer is aware his account is being 
investigated; he will definitely move the money out of the court’s jurisdiction. In 
these circumstances, the court can make a ‘no say order’. This will prevent the 
bank from disclosing any information to the wrongdoer. However, the wrongdoer 
might be allowed to operate his account in a normal way, but large amount of 
money may not be withdrawn from the account: In the English proceedings 
brought by the Nigerian Government against the Abacha family, the ‘no say’ order 
was in place for six weeks before notice was given to the family. During that time a 
wealth of information was gathered for disclosure and freezing injunctions in 
relation to accounts at banks revealed by disclosure from other banks. Almost 20 
banks were subject to orders at the end of the process. 
Know Your Customer Test 
Article 52 (1) of the Convention provides: “Without prejudice to article 14 of this 
Convention, each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary, in 
accordance with its domestic law, to require financial institutions within its 
jurisdiction to verify the identity of customers, to take reasonable steps to 
determine the identity of beneficial owners of funds deposited into high-value 
accounts and to conduct enhanced scrutiny of accounts sought or maintained by or 
on behalf of individuals who are, or have been, entrusted with prominent public 
functions and their family members and close associates. Such enhanced scrutiny 
shall be reasonably designed to detect suspicious transactions for the purpose of 
                                                             
1 [1975] 1 WLR 302, CA. 
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reporting to competent authorities and should not be so construed as to discourage 
or prohibit financial institutions from doing business with any legitimate 
customer”. 
Also Article 65 of the Convention provides enhanced provisions of identification in 
relation to politically exposed persons and their families and associates. The whole 
package of measures in Article 65 addresses many of the core issues associated 
with abuse of office, lax banking controls and the use of offshore banks. If every 
country were to pass legislation giving effect to the measures contained in this 
article, and ensure proper enforcement, there is no doubt that opportunities for 
looting to take place would be radically reduced.
1
 (Freeman, 2011) 
At the moment, know your customer test is being enforced within the Nigerian 
financial industry, but more still have to be done (Opara, 2007, pp. 65-93; Serio, 
2008). Due diligence test must be performed by the banks to ascertain the identity 
of their customers with the aim of eliminating identity theft, assets looting, and 
money laundry (Serio, 2008). The test must aim to match customer’s record, and 
salary, with deposit and transactions in respect of the account. Disclosure of 
suspicious money transfer and deposit must be made to appropriate authorities.  
 
7. Conclusion 
This study has shown that efforts to trace, identify, confiscate and return stolen 
assets to Nigeria by law enforcement agencies, and through assistance from other 
states, has yielded insignificant gains vis-à-vis the huge sums of money being 
siphoned abroad, though compared to other jurisdictions where corruption is 
rampant, Nigeria’s assets recovery might be considered a modest achievement. 
This study enquired and highlighted forms of proceedings available to recover ill-
gotten assets and examined the evidence gathering process and methodology. It is 
the view of this author that the forms of proceeding available in Nigeria to recover 
looted assets are inadequate. Nigeria needs to consider and implement other forms 
of proceedings that comply with international standards. For example, the non-
conviction model discussed above will eliminate some of the problems associated 
                                                             
1 Available at:  
http://www.ipocafrica.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=69&Itemid=68 
Accessed 12 September 2011). 
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with the conviction regime. This paper has also emphasized the urgent need to 
create special courts to tackle corruption and to recover looted assets. 
In sum, to effectively tackle the menace of corruption and to be able to effectively 
and successfully recover ill-gotten wealth, Nigeria needs to embrace a combination 
of conviction and non-conviction regimes with effective international diplomacy. 
The need to effectively recover looted assets cannot be over emphasized, recovery 
of looted assets would boost domestic saving, which in turn would induce higher 
investment (Adekoya, 2008, pp. 272-281). In addition repatriated capital flight 
would increase the taxable base, raising government revenue, which would allow 
the government to increase public investment. This will ultimately boost capital 
formation, a key driver of long-term growth. (Hippolte & Ndikumana, 2008) 
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